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This thesis examines the creation of the United States Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM). This assessment reviews the past and recent attempts to create a unified
strategic command over nuclear forces. Interviews conducted by the author with the major
individuals involved in the current creation of STRATCOM, along with a historical review
of past attempts to consolidate nuclear forces provide the basis for this thesis. In
examining why STRATCOM was created, two competing arguments were used to answer
the question presented. The main argument for the creation of STRATCOM was the fact
that there was no need to keep strategic nuclear forces in separate commands at the end
of the Cold War. The counter argument is that the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 alone
forced the creation of STRATCOM. The results from this research show that there is now
a trend among the military leaders to cooperate among themselves. The author uses the
reasons for the creation of STRATCOM as a possible blueprint for how the Services will
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This thesis examines the creation of the newest unified
command: United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) . The
thesis delves into two periods in history. The first period
begins with the implementation of the 1948 Key West Agreement
to 1960. The second period begins with the passage of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and concludes with the formal
establishment of USSTRATCOM on 1 June 1992.
The first period is examined with regard to the historical
significance of the unified strategic command issue. This
period is used to explain the origins of the Air Force and
Navy rivalry. While there was certainly another rivalry
between the Army and Navy, this portion of the thesis focuses
on the issues that put the Navy and the newly created Air
Force 'at odds. The Bomber vs. Carrier debate and the Air
Force's first attempts to consolidate all strategic nuclear
forces under one unified command are examined to put the
establishment of STRATCOM in historical perspective.
The second period begins following passage of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. This period is used to examine
the reasons why a unified strategic command was created after
thirty years of continual fighting between the Air Force and
the Navy. Two main arguments are examined to determine why
USSTRATCOM was created. The first argument is that the
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 alone forced the creation
of the new command. The second competing argument is
vi
that the end of the Cold War alone forced the creation of
USSTRATCOM.
There are two basic methodologies used in the course of
this research. The first is a content analysis of
Congressional documents, public speeches by military leaders
and members of Congress, and writings by individuals who were
involved in the unified strategic command idea from the 1950 's
to the establishment of USSTRATCOM on 1 June 1992. Interviews
are the second methodology used. These interviews are
important because they put into perspective the debate over
the strategic command and what a monumental achievement it has
been to create USSTRATCOM today. The following individuals
were interviewed between November 1992 and March 1993
:
-Gen. George L. Butler, USAF, Commander-in-Chief,
United States Strategic Command;
-VADM. Michael C. Colley, USN, Deputy Commander-in-
Chief, United States Strategic Command;
-Capt . Paul Brown, USN, Organizational Policy Branch
(J-5) , Joint Staff;
-CDR. C.J. Pickart, USN, aide to VADM Colley;
-MAJ. Paula Thornhill, USAF, CINCSTRAT staff
Group/JO 04;
-Dr. Robert Parks, SAC/USSTRATCOM Historian.
This thesis concludes that neither the Goldwater-Nichols
Act of 1986 nor the end of the Cold War were the sole reasons
for the creation of USSTRATCOM. The chronology of actions
vii
taken by the JCS after the passage of Goldwater-Nichols proves
that this piece of legislation alone did not force the
creation of USSTRATCOM. The timing of the staffing process of
the strategic command proposal reveals that neither the fall
of the Berlin Wall nor the collapse of the Soviet Union
provided sufficient impetus needed to force acceptance of the
strategic command concept. At best, GNA provided an "enabling
function" through its cumulative effect on Service mindsets,
or culture. The thesis concludes that the primary reason that
USSTRATCOM was created was due to a combination of timing and
trust established between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Service Chiefs. These men were willing to put
Service rivalries aside to create a command "whose time had
come .
"
Finally, this thesis maintains that this new Service
cooperation will continue if the leaders of the military can
put aside their old Service rivalries. Only through
cooperation can the Services hope to successfully downsize and
still leave a strong force in place.
Vlll
I . INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the origins of USSTRATCOM. This
thesis will investigate the question: Why was USSTRATCOM
created? This question is quite relevant because the Air
Force and the Navy have for over thirty years fought over the
idea of one unified command over strategic nuclear weapons.
Since this- is an historical question, past attempts at
consolidation of nuclear forces will be reviewed to link the
past with the present
.
Two competing arguments for the establishment of
USSTRATCOM will be examined. The first argument is that the
collapse of the Soviet Union was the main reason for the
establishment of USSTRATCOM. The competing argument is that
the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was the significant factor
in the consolidation of all U.S. nuclear forces. Which event
was the major driver in the creation of USSTRATCOM? The
answer to the question of why USSTRATCOM was created could
possibly foretell the U.S. defense agenda for future
consolidations. By describing past arguments about the
consolidation issue, the reader will be able link the past
problems of consolidation to the present problems to see which
of the competing arguments was the clear reason for
consolidation. An examination of the views of the Air Force
and the Navy is central to understanding the problems of this
consolidation.
The thesis also includes a content analysis of
Congressional and other documents and speeches that deal
directly with the creation of USSTRATCOM. Briefings on the
creation of USSTRATCOM also were reviewed. These briefings
were given primarily to the Service Chiefs and the Unified
Commanders-in-Chief. This methodology will elucidate the
reason for the consolidation of all U.S. nuclear forces.
There are several primary sources that form the data base
for this thesis. First are interviews arranged by the author.
These interviews were primarily conducted in March 1993 while
on trips made to Washington D.C. and Offutt AFB, NE. Persons
interviewed for this thesis included the major players in the
development of USSTRATCOM: General George L. Butler, USAF,
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Strategic Command, Vice Admiral
Michael C. Colley, USN, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, U.S.
Strategic Command, and Captain Paul Brown, USN, JCS, J-5. The
second primary source for data comes from Congressional
testimony which spans the time covering 1958 to 1992.
Briefings that were given to the Service Chiefs and the
Unified Commanders-in-chief are another primary source.
Review of various histories that were written about Strategic
Air Command and other attempts to create a strategic command
comprises the final primary source material.
There are two major limitations regarding the data for
this thesis. The first limitation stems from the fact that
USSTRATCOM is new. There has been little time for the
Services to react to the new command. The second limitation
results from the speed with which USSTRATCOM was established,
e.g., there was little time and hence, scant opportunity for
criticism of the new command before it became established.
This thesis is divided into six chapters. The second
chapter describes the Cold War structure under which the U.S.
nuclear forces were commanded. In this chapter, the old
Strategic Air Command is examined with regard to its role in
the U.S. nuclear equation. Targeting issues, particularly the
mechanism to develop the Single Integrated Operation Plan
(SIOP) , are reviewed. Past military nuclear doctrine is
briefly examined with regard to its role in nuclear targeting.
Finally, the employment of nuclear forces and the alert status
of these forces is recounted.
Chapter III describes past attempts to consolidate
strategic nuclear forces. The Air Force's attempt in 1958-
1960 to create a strategic command is examined and the
problems of consolidation are described.
Chapters IV and V are the heart of the thesis. These
chapters deal with the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and the
collapse of the Soviet Union respectively. These two chapters
attempt to discover the real reasons for the creation of
USSTRATCOM.
In the conclusion, the question that was presented in the
beginning of the thesis is evaluated. This evaluation
postulates the real reason why USSTRATCOM was created,
especially in light of thirty years of inter-service rivalry.
II. STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
A. BACKGROUND OF STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
On 21 March 1946, Strategic Air Command was established at
Andrews AFB, Washington, D.C. This command was a part of the
redesignation of the Continental Air Forces. The Continental
Air Forces were divided into three separate commands. They
were the Strategic Air Command, Tactical Air Command, and Air
Defense Command. The head of the new Strategic Air Command
(SAC) was General George C. Kenney . * General Carl Spaatz,
then Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, stated the
mission of the Strategic Air Command:
The Strategic Air Command will be prepared to conduct
long-range offensive operations in any part of the world
either independently or in cooperation with land and Naval
forces_; to conduct maximum range reconnaissance over land
and sea either independently or in cooperation with land
and Naval forces; to provide combat units capable of
intense and sustained combat operations employing the
latest and most advanced weapons; to train units and
personnel for the maintenance of the Strategic Forces in
all parts of the world; to perform such special missions
as the Commanding General, Army Air Force may direct.
This mission statement shows that SAC was going to be the
holder of strategic forces.
1 Norman Polmar and Timothy Laur, eds
.
, Strategic Air
Command , 2nd ed., (Baltimore: The Nautical & Aviation
Publishing Company of America, 1990), 7.
The mention of "latest and most advanced weapons. . . " indicates
that SAC would control not only present strategic weapon
systems but those systems that have not yet been developed.
The man who was to propel the Strategic Air Command (SAC)
to prominence was General Curtis E. LeMay. General LeMay was
the second commander of SAC. He relieved General Kenney on 19
October 1948. 2 One of the first actions that General LeMay
took was to move SAC from Andrews AFB in Washington D.C. to
Offutt AFB in Omaha, Nebraska. General LeMay stated that he
had to: "... build the whole thing [SAC] up to make it
effective and ready to go." 3 He also maintained that the
decision to move SAC to Offutt was made before he took
command. 4
General LeMay was the driving force behind the development
of SAC. It was during his tenure, 19 October 1948-3 June
1957, that SAC became the vanguard of the U.S. nuclear defense
force. By the time General LeMay left SAC in 1957, he had




3 General Curtis E. LeMay and MacKinlay, Mission with
LeMay , (New York: DoubleDay & Company, INC., 1965), 429.
4 Ibid.
5 Norman Polmar and Timothy M. Laur, ed., Strategic Air
Command , 2nd ed., (Baltimore: The Nautical & Aviation
Publishing Company of America, 1990), 48.
The reason that LeMay was able to achieve such success was
largely due to his leadership style. From the very beginning
he was concerned with every aspect of his command. His
concerns ranged from training his troops to how they lived.
A good example of how he took care of his people was the
building of "SAC-Type" barracks. These barracks made living
conditions more homelike rather than cold barracks living.
The other end of the spectrum was the operational side of SAC.
General LeMay instituted the Operational Readiness Inspection
(ORI) . This was a type of inspection to see if the alert
forces could execute their portion of the Single Integrated
Operation Plan (SIOP) within the prescribed time limit. In
his book, General LeMay describes an ORI:
Our big effort is in what we call the ORI, the Operational
Readiness Inspection or test. In this, the inspector
arrives on the scene, utterly surprising everyone. He
says ".Execute your war plan, " and you either do it or you
don't. He's not one bit interested in whether you are
short ten blankets or not. What he wants to know is, "
Can you fight? and with what? and how will you fight , and
how soon?" 7
This type of inspection was infamous throughout the Air Force
and was well known in the other Services. The ORI was used to
keep SAC alert forces, both bomber forces and missile forces,
on top of their: profession. The thought was that if they
failed the inspection they would lose a nuclear war.
b General Curtis E. LeMay and MacKinlay Kantor, Mission
With LeMay
,
(New York: DoubleDay & Company, INC., 1965), 467.
7 Ibid., 446.
By the time that General LeMay left SAC, the vanguard for
the U.S. strategic nuclear forces were on line and maintaining
a watch for any possible Soviet nuclear attack. One of the
two legacies that General LeMay left SAC was the "Spot
Promotion" for combat crews that were the top of their field. 8
This spot promotion system was associated with combat crew
duty. Officers and enlisted alike were eligible for the
promotions. General LeMay believed that this was an incentive
to keep up the morale of the SAC alert crews and keep them
proficient. By 28 December 1965, General McConnell, U.S. Air
Force Chief of Staff, terminated the spot promotion system
that General LeMay had instituted. 9 The main reason for the
termination was to bring SAC promotions in line with the rest
of the Air Force.
The last legacy that General LeMay left SAC was the their
emblem and the motto for SAC. For the next 4 5 years, the
motto for SAC was "Peace IS Our Profession." The motto came
about as a result of a combat crew competition held to come up
with a motto for the command. 10
On 3 June 1957, General LeMay was relieved as commander
of SAC and reassigned as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air
8 Norman Polmar and Timothy M. Laur, Strategic Air
Command , 2nd ed., (Baltimore: The Nautical & Aviation
Publishing Company of America, 1990), 19.
Ibid. , 98.
10 Ibid., 60.
Force. However, General LeMay kept on top of the functions of
SAC. Between 11-13 November 1957, General LeMay was the pilot
in command of a KC-13 5 when it broke the world speed record
from Westover AFB, Massachusetts to Buenos Aires, Argentina.
The 'second record that he broke was the return trip to
Washington D.C. 11
There were many other Commanders of SAC who left their
marks on the command. However, it was General LeMay who built
SAC and made it the vanguard of the U.S. strategic nuclear
forces. The reputation of SAC was built by achieving records
that had never been achieved in aerial flight. Most of these
records were broken trying to prove that SAC was willing to go
to great lengths to protect the country and establish its
reputation as the world's finest fighting force.
The mission of SAC was to preserve the peace during the
Cold War by deterring the Soviet Union from launching an
attack against the United States or its allies, but SAC also
participated in the Korean, Vietnam, and Persian Gulf wars.
The use of SAC in these wars showed that it was still a major
conventional strategic asset.
The creation of SAC under General LeMay was a monumental
feat. In a short time, General LeMay was able to make SAC
the guardian of the United States' nuclear arsenal. General
LeMay is instrumental to this thesis because as General Butler
11 Ibid., 52
points out, General LeMay was the father of the strategic
command concept. The drive of General LeMay could be seen
when he tried to dominate the nuclear target list of the
nation. It was during his attempt to consolidate nuclear
targeting under SAC that he came up with the idea of a unified
strategic command. When General LeMay left SAC, he became the
Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force. In this powerful
position, he was able to push his idea of a strategic command
on General White the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. In the
end, the father of the strategic command concept was General
LeMay. lz He saw SAC as the eventual strategic command and he
took steps to make sure it was ready to assume that role when
the time came.
B. JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF (JSTPS)
General LeMay has been credited with the formation of SAC.
General Power, LeMay' s successor, is credited with
establishing JSTPS by direction of Secretary of Defense Thomas
Gates. However, JSTPS was a compromise between the Air Force
and Navy proposals on consolidation. 13
In an attempt to consolidate nuclear operations, Secretary
of Defense Thomas Gates offered a compromise that soothed both
12 Butler, interview.
13 Charles K. Hopkins, Unclassified History of The Joint
Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) , (Omaha: Staff
Historian for the Commander of Strategic Air Command, 15 April
1989), 5.
10
the Air Force and Navy while consolidating strategic nuclear
targeting. The compromise stemmed from an Air Force attempt
to consolidate all nuclear forces under one unified command.
Since the Navy and Air Force could not see eye-to-eye on the
unified command, Secretary Gates came up with the idea of a
unified targeting staff that would report directly to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 14
On 16 August 1960, Gates established the Joint Strategic
Target Planning Staff at Offutt AFB, Omaha, Nebraska. H ' The
Commander of SAC was to be the director of the planning staff
with a Navy Vice Admiral as his deputy. After 1963,
representatives of the other nuclear CinCs were also included
on the planning staff. 16
Desmond Ball outlines the functions of the planning staff:
The JSTPS performs two primary functions: the first is to
maintain the National Strategic Target List (NSTL) , which
contains data on all the targets that might be attacked in
a nuclear strike; the second is to prepare the SIOP. The
SIOP assigns targets to all strategic weapon systems,
including "bombers, fighter bombers, intercontinental
ballistic and air launched missiles... and missile
submarines . " 17
This explanation shows that part of General LeMay's idea of a
14 Charles K. Hopkins, Unclassified History of the Joint
Strategic Target- Planning Staff , (Omaha: Command Historian for
CinCSAC, 15 March 1989), 5.
15 Desmond Ball, "The Development of the SIOP, 1960-1983, "
in Strategic Nuclear Targeting , ed. Desmond Ball and Jeffrey




unified strategic command was used. However, the Air Force
did not get their full proposal which not only included
running the nuclear planning but also owning all strategic
nuclear forces.
In 1946, the JCS began developing war plans that used
national policy objectives as their basis. By the end of the
decade, these plans became the Joint Strategic Capabilities
Plan (JSCP) . In later years, the JSCP became the guidance by
which the Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) was
developed. 13 It is important to note that SAC was the author
of the SIOP. Since SAC developed the SIOP, they had
significant influence on the JCSP.
The National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and the SIOP are
the link between the national policy objectives and the
operational nuclear forces. 19 The Nuclear Strategic
Targeting and Attack Policy (NSTAP) later called the Nuclear
Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP) was the guidance for the
SIOP. Charles Hopkins stated:
Formulation of subsequent NSTAPs and guidance was an
evolutionary process. At first the DOD and JCS developed
general guidelines based on public statements by
administration officials as well as more detailed internal
directives. In this manner, they incorporated the
"massive destruction" strategy of the Eisenhower-Dulles
era and later the "assured destruction" strategy of the
Kennedy-McNamara era. What is generally accepted as the
18 Charles K. Hopkins, Unclassified History of the Joint
Strategic Target Planning Staff
,
(Omaha: Command Historian for
CinCSAC, 15 March 1989) ,1.
19 Ibid. , 3.
12
first policy statement on nuclear deterrence was spelled
out by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles late in the
Eisenhower administration and was called "massive
retaliation. " 20
This statement shows that the development of nuclear war plans
was just as much politics as it was a military issue. Since
SAC was the country's premier nuclear war planner, they
articulated their point of view through the JCS on what the
national strategy should look like.
The function of the JSTPS is to form the overall nuclear
plan for the U.S. strategic nuclear forces. The SIOP which is
produced by the JSTPS is an ever-changing document. J1
Constant input is needed from the military and the National
Command Authority (NCA) to make the plan work. Political and
intelligence inputs are very important to the SIOP.
C. NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE
This section briefly examines the alert status of the U.S.
strategic nuclear forces. The purpose here is not to outline
the actual types of weapons that were at the disposal of the
President, but to show the readiness posture from 1958 to
1991. The three areas that are reviewed are the bomber
alerts, missile alerts and the airborne command post.
Unclassified naval submarine alert rates are not available.
20 Ibid. , 4.
21 Ibid., 1.
13
During the early days of SAC, the goal was to have one-
third of the bomber force on alert. By 1957, SAC had
established a one-third ground alert for its bomber force.
This meant that one-third of the bomber force was on a 15
minute alert. 22 By 1958, the Air Force reorganized to
accommodate the one-third alert status. However, over time
the percentages of aircraft on alert steadily increased. The
Vietnam era saw the alert rate fall as low as 28%. This was
mainly due to SAC conducting bombing missions over North
Vietnam. 23 After the Vietnam war, the alert percentages rose
dramatically to an average of about 97% of the one third
required to be on alert. 24
SAC also tested an airborne alert posture from 15
September 1958 through 15 December 1958. The nickname was
Headstart I. 25 In 1959, General Power testified that SAC was
maintaining an airborne alert fully loaded and ready to fly to
targets in the Soviet Union. 26 This alert status continued
22 Norman Polmar and Timothy M. Laur, Strategic Air
Command , 2nd ed., (Baltimore: The Nautical &Aviation
Publishing Company of America, 1990), 49.
23 Data provided by Dr. Parks, Historian for USSTRATCOM,
from SAC archives. Dr. Parks provided the data during a
telephone interview with the author on 1 December 1992.
24 Ibid.
25 Norman Polmar and Timothy M. Laur ed., Strategic Air
Command , 2nd ed (Baltimore: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing
Company of America, 1990) , 57.
26 Ibid., 63.
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until the solid propellent ICBMs came into the arsenal. In
1965, during the high point of the airborne alert nicknamed
CHROME DOME, SAC had as much as one full Wing airborne. By
the time the airborne alert ended in 19 67, SAC had as few as
4 B-52s airborne. 27
The missile alert rates were somewhat better than the
bomber rates. The initial goal was one-third, like the
bombers. 28 By the time SAC was disestablished, almost 100%
of the missiles available were on alert. 29 These alert rates
show that SAC was willing to maintain a high state of
readiness in case there was an unprovoked nuclear attack from
the Soviet Union. SAC also could have been trying
concurrently to prove that they were the command that should
be commanding all strategic nuclear forces.
The airborne command post, better known as LOOKING GLASS,
began permanent alerts on 3 February 1961. 30 LOOKING GLASS
was a converted KC-135 tanker that was outfitted with advanced
communication equipment. This alert center was in constant
communication with SAC HQ, JCS, SAC bases, and airborne
Data provided by Dr. Parks during a telephone
interview with the author on 1 December 1992.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Norman Polmar and Timothy M. Laur ed., Strategic Air
Command
,
(Baltimore: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing
Company of America, 19 90) ,75.
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aircraft. 31 If there were a nuclear attack on SAC
headquarters, the airborne command post could execute any
launch order received from the National Command Authority.
This section showed how SAC was on a constant war time
alert- status . It seems that ever since the Air Force proposed
the strategic command concept, they had tried to prove that
they were the ones to carry the nuclear burden. They had
developed a system that integrated every facet of nuclear war.
The only weapon system that was not under SAC control was the
ballistic submarine force. In the final analysis, when SAC
was disestablished and STRATCOM established, in June 1992,
none of the nuclear command structure that SAC used was
dismantled. STRATCOM simply took over the nuclear command
structure that once belonged to SAC. This would indicate that
SAC was always ready to assume the STRATCOM role if they had
ever gotten the chance.
31 Ibid.
16




The creation of Strategic Air Command was crucial to the
birth of the Air Force. Men such as General Curtis LeMay
pushed hard to see that SAC not only flourished but the Air
Force did the same. This chapter examines early conflicts
between the Air Force and the Navy with regard to the concept
of a unified command for strategic nuclear forces.
The two areas that are examined center on the carrier
versus the bomber issue. This first debate seemingly ended
with the "Revolt of the Admirals." The second area to be
reviewed is the first debate on a unified strategic command.
This debate rekindled the fire that had developed between the
Air Force and the Navy over the carrier-bomber debate.
B. THE CARRIER VS. THE BOMBER DEBATE.
The origins of the Air Force and Navy rivalry go back to
the Key West agreement in 1948. Secretary of Defense
Forrestal held a conference with his Service chiefs in Key
West Florida from March 11 to the 14th. The purpose of this
conference was to establish the roles and missions of the
Services
.
Ever since the National Security Act of 1947, the Services
had argued about roles and missions. Secretary Forrestal
17
believed that it was time to flesh out the specific roles and
missions of the Services. Forrestal stated that by sitting
down with the chiefs, they could collectively come up with a
roles and mission statement that everyone could live with at
least for the near future. 32 Secretary Forrestal stated in
his diaries the settlements of the disputes over roles and
missions
:
1. For planning purposes, Marine Corps to be limited with
the inclusion of a sentence in the final document that the
Marines are not to create another land army.
2. Air Force recognizes right of Navy to proceed with the
development of weapons the Navy considers essential to its
function but with proviso that the Navy will not develop
a separate strategic air force, this function being
reserved to the Air Force. However, the Navy in carrying
out of its function is to have the right to attack inland
targets for example, to reduce and neutralize airfields
from which enemy aircraft may be sortying to attack the
Fleet
.
3. Air Force recognized the right and need for the Navy
to participate in an all-out air campaign. And more
specifically, the Navy was not to be denied use of the
atomic bomb. 33
These roles and missions state the Air Force had the
responsibility of strategic bombing. However, the Navy had
the right to do bombing while performing their mission. The
only problem with these mission statements were that no line
32 Paul Y. Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-3 6 Bombers:
Appropriations, Strategy and Politics," from Harold Stein,
ed., American Civil-Military Decisions
, ( Alabama: University
Press, 1963) , 474.
33 Walter Millis (ed) , The Forrestal Diaries (Viking, New
York, 1951), 392. Quoted in Paul Y. Hammond, "Super Carrier
and B-3 6 Bombers: appropriations, strategy and Politics, 474.
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could be drawn between what was an Air Force bombing
prerogative and what was the Navy's. This ambiguity would
cause many problems that went on for decades.
While these were the basic roles and missions of the
Services, the new aircraft carrier that the Navy wanted to
build was not finalized as the Navy expected at the end of the
conference. 34 The Air Force was upset about the carrier
because they believed that it would infringe on the strategic
bombing mission which was the Air Force's responsibility.
Secretary Forrestal had stated earlier in the conference that
the President had approved the construction of the new 80,000
ton carrier that the Navy wanted. The Chiefs said "that they
would go along with it because it was the President's
program." 35 The misunderstanding that came out of the Key
West conference became an outright battle between the Air
Force and the Navy over the fate of the carrier.
The misunderstanding began at a news conference. The
Secretary of Defense boldly announced that the new carrier was
going to be built for strategic air warfare. This infuriated
the Air Force because strategic bombing was their purview. 36
Further statements that were made by Secretary Forrestal about
34 Hammond, 47 5.
35 Denf eld testimony in Hearings on H.R. 6049 , House Armed




the carrier maintained that the carrier would not be built
strictly for a Navy role but also to contribute to the Air
Force's mission. 37
The vague statements made by Forrestal about the Navy's
new Carrier fueled the misunderstanding between the Service
Chiefs and Forrestal as to what had really been agreed to at
Key West. 33 The Air Force took exception with the new
carrier. The Air Force saw the carrier as a strategic asset on
which they should have a vote. The Navy maintained that the
carrier was not a strategic asset, although the new carrier
would launch aircraft that could drop nuclear weapons. The
idea that the Navy could drop nuclear weapons seemed to
encroach on the Air Force mission of strategic bombing.
The fight for the carrier continued throughout the summer
of 1948. On 20 September 1948, Secretary of Defense Forrestal
and the Service Chiefs met at the Naval War College in
Newport, Rhode Island. The purpose of this meeting was to
deal with the roles and missions issues they had discussed at
Key West. This time however, more efforts were made to define






The airplane had several functions (e.g., bombing,
transport and fighter)
. Therefore, specific missions for the
airplane needed to be defined. The Navy had aircraft that
could do the strategic bombing mission just as the Air Force.
However, the Air Force was primarily responsible for strategic
bombing according to the Key West Agreement. The problem, as
the Air Force saw it, was that the Navy was getting a weapons
system, the carrier, without any input from the Service that
had primary responsibility for the carrier's strategic
mission. 40 There was no real resolution of the airplane
roles and missions issue to the satisfaction of either the Air
Force or the Navy. In the end, Secretary of Defense Forrestal
left office without resolving the carrier-bomber issue.
C. THE ADMIRALS REVOLT
The
_
revolt of the admirals was a direct result of
interservice rivalry over the cancellation of the carrier
United States . After the 1948 election, President Truman
decided to replace Secretary Forrestal with a man who was more
forceful and willing to knock a few heads. 41 Louis Johnson
was the man that Truman selected to reign in the Services.
The Navy was- confident that the new carrier was safe after
the Newport conference. The Air Force had failed for the
40 Ibid.
41 Keith D. McFarland, "The 1949 Revolt of The Admirals, "
Parameters 11 (Spring 1981): 55.
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moment to get the carrier canceled. However, the new
Secretary of Defense had another agenda and it did not include
a new carrier for the Navy. In fact, when Secretary Johnson
was sworn in as the new Secretary of Defense, he had publicly
stated that he was going to bring real unification to the
armed forces. 42
The Navy had been most opposed to the unification of the
Services. This unification brought the Services under the
direct control of a Secretary of Defense. The consolidation
of the Services under one secretary would centralize control
of the Services. This meant that the Secretary of Defense was
the main speaker for the military instead of the individual
Services. This did not fit into the plans of the New
Secretary of Defense. One of Secretary Johnson's first acts
to drive home the point that the Services were going to unify
was the cancellation of observances of the individual Service
days (i.e., Army Day). 43
Secretary Johnson met with the Service Chiefs to discuss
their views on the continuation of the new Navy carrier. The
Army Chief of Staff, General Omar Bradley, and Air Force Chief
of Staff General Hoyt Vandenberg agreed with Johnson that the
carrier should be canceled. Admiral Louis Denfeld, Chief of
Naval Operations, on the other hand, disagreed
42 Ibid. , 56
43 Ibid.
22
with the other Chiefs and believed that the carrier should be
built. 44
On 22 April 1949, Secretary Johnson had made up his mind
to finally cancel the carrier. However, before he made the
decision public, Johnson told the chairmen of both the House
and Senate Armed Service Committee, Representative Carl Vinson
and Senator Millard Tydings . The next day Johnson advised the
President of his decision to cancel the carrier. Truman
agreed with Johnson's decision. The next day Secretary
Johnson told Secretary of the Navy Sullivan to cancel the
carrier. 45
This cancellation was what the Navy most feared when the
issue of unification had come to a head. E.B. Potter in his
biography of Admiral Burke stated the Navy's feelings on the
cancellation:
Johnson's high-handed cancellation, without detailed
study, without giving the navy a chance to present its
case, without consulting or even notifying Secretary
Sullivan, Admiral Denfeld, or interested congressional
committees, infuriated naval leaders and aroused adverse
reactions in Congress. 46
The cancellation of the carrier and other decisions that a
44 United ': States Congress, House, Armed Services
Committee, The National Defense Program-Unification and
Strategy, Hearings , 81st Cong., 1st Sess.,pp. 619-20. Quoted
by Keith McFarland in "The Revolt of The Admirals, " Parameters
11 (Spring 1981) : 56-57.
45 McFarland., 57
46 E.B. Potter, Admiral Arleigh Burke (New York: Random
House, 1990), 320.
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powerful Secretary of Defense could make without consultation
of the Services is what the Navy feared the most.
The Navy, in an attempt to preserve its institutional
standing, made a public appeal to the Congress and the nation.
Cedric R. Worth, a civilian assistant to the Under Secretary
of the Navy, leaked evidence that there was corruption that
involved the Secretary of Defense and Air Force Secretary
Symington. Op-23, the office that worked on the unification
issue and headed by Captain Arleigh Burke, helped to gather
information for the charges. However, the report was to
remain confidential. Cedric Worth broke his promise of
confidentiality and leaked the report. 47
This leak set off a flurry of events that began with
Congressional hearings. The Navy's top aviator, Admiral
Arthur W. Radford, came to Washington from his post as
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet to head off the
testimony in favor of the carrier. 48 The reason that the
Navy took such a vocal stance against the Secretary of Defense
and the Joint Chiefs was their stated belief that the Navy was
being "systematically and intentionally destroyed." 49
The Navy took the offensive and labelled the Air Force's




B-36 as a "billion dollar blunder." 50 This led to
Congressional testimony from the Navy, Air Force, General
Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary
Johnson. By the end of the testimony, Cedric Worth had
admitted the charges were fabricated and Admiral Denfeld
backed his admirals to his own professional demise. Captain
Burke was also on the hit list of then Navy Secretary Matthews
because of his office's involvement in the allegations against
the Secretary of Defense. His promotion to Flag rank was
blocked by Secretary of the Navy Matthews. 51 In the end,
Captain Burke was promoted to flag rank and eventually became
the Chief of Naval Operations during the next attempt by the
Air Force to consolidate nuclear forces under one unified
commander
.
D. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CARRIER ISSUE
The best way to analyze the behavior of the Navy and the
Air Force in the previous two issues is to review the
institutions that each Service represents. Carl Builder, in
his book The Masks of War , does an excellent job of
characterizing the separate Services.
Builder describes the Navy's character:
50 Ibid. , 60.
51 E.B. Potter. , 328-30.
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The Navy, more than any of the other services and over
anything else, is an institution. That institution is
marked by two strong senses of itself: its independence
and stature. 52
The Navy's stature as an independent institution is on
a level with that of the U.S. government...
Who is the Navy? It is the supranational institution that
has inherited the British Navy's throne to naval
supremacy. What is it about? It is about preserving and
wielding sea power as the most important and flexible kind
of military power for America as a maritime nation. The
means to those ends are the institution and its
traditions, both of which provide for a permanence beyond
the people who serve them. 53
This kind of attitude is what the Navy lived up to for
generations. This impression about the Navy and its
institutional prominence over the other Services is what has
caused many problems for the Navy throughout the last four-
and-a-half decades.
The reason the Navy has resisted change is because its
institutional independence is lessened each time there is a
reorganization. The Navy lost its independence in the
National Security Act of 1947. In this Act, the Navy fell
from the prominence and independence of a cabinet position in
the President's administration to a subcabinet level.
This meant that the Navy no longer had the power to go
directly to the .-President if it wanted to. The centralized
control of the military through the Secretary of Defense
52 Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War , (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1989), 31.
53 Ibid., 32.
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threatened the Navy. This threat was realized by Truman's
Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson. When Johnson took the Air
Force's side on the B-36 issue, this galvanized the Navy
against any further attempts at centralization. This
stonewalling of reform or reorganization has put the Navy in
a bad light compared to the other Services. Builder shows how
the Navy has been viewed by the Army and Air Force throughout
the years
:
So fierce had been the Navy's opposition to service
unification, that even Truman was intrigued with one
exasperated Army unification proposal which suggested that
"the only way to overcome the Navy's resistance would be
to do away with the War Department, transfer all of its
elements to the Navy, and redesignate that organization as
the Department of Defense." 54
"The Department of the Navy, " General David Jones
volunteered, "is the most strategically independent of the
services-it has its own army, navy and air force. It is
least dependent on others. It would prefer to be given a
mission, retain complete control over all assets, and be
left alone. " 55
The statements above are accurate. The Navy is independent
and it considers change to be an institutional threat . The
centralization of the defense establishment caused the Navy to
lose control over its direction and mission. This situation
was exacerbated by the Air Force, the new kid on the block,
which tried to control all aspects of strategic warfare. The
54 David C. Jones, "What's Wrong with Our Defense
Establishment," New York Times Magazine , 7 November 1982,
p. 73; quoted by Lacy, Within Bounds , p. 53 6; cited by Builder,




Air Force's desire to control strategic weapons ran head long
into the Navy's future. This future was the aircraft carrier.
The Air Force's attempt to kill the carrier due to its use as
a strategic bomber platform was seen by the Navy as an attack
on the Navy as an institution.
The revolt of the admirals was an excellent example of how
the Navy as reacted to an encroachment on it turf. Despite
the Korean War, scars of the "Admiral's Revolt" persisted long
enough to be an issue when Admiral Burke became Chief of Naval
Operations. Once he became the CNO, Admiral Burke stonewalled
the Air Force's idea of unifying all strategic forces under
one command headed by an Air Force officer.
The Air Force, on the other hand, is quite different from
the Navy; according to Builder:
The Air Force, conceived by theorists of air power as an
independent and decisive instrument of warfare, sees
itself as the embodiment of an idea, a concept of warfare,
a strategy made possible and sustained by modern
technology. The bond is not an institution, but the love
of flying machines and flight. 56
The Navy had an established institutional prominence, the Air
Force was too young to have the Navy's institutional
prominence at the time of the bomber issue. The new status of
the Air Force, defined by the National Security Act of 1947,
and its role and mission, as defined by the Key West
agreement, gave it the ammunition to go after the Navy. This
Air Force and Navy rivalry that began in the 1940 's lasted
56 Builder, .32.
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until 1990, when it succumbed to a changing mindset in the
military brought about by a new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.
E. THE FIRST ATTEMPT TO CONSOLIDATE STRATEGIC FORCES
The end of the "Admirals Revolt" left the Air Force and
the Navy in a serious rivalry. The Navy viewed the Air Force
as a threat. The Air Force, as the new service, -viewed itself
as the only service needed to win the next war. The Air
Force's attempt to establish itself as a stand-alone service
ran head long into a naval institution that was not willing to
give up sovereignty over either its ships or submarines.
By the mid-1950 's, the issue of unification of the
services was brought to the forefront of the military
establishment. The Air Force once again was out in front of
the push for service unification. General Nathan F. Twining,
Air Force Chief of Staff, believed that the services were
trying to attain "service self-sufficiency" during a time when
tasks were not service-specific anymore. 57 General Twining
was in favor of a single service but he knew that the other
services, especially the Navy, were against the idea. 58
57 Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic
Thinking in the United States Air Force 1907-1960 , Vol.1




The next best thing to service unification was the
creation of the "Unified commands." General Twining thought
that a unified command was a very good idea. Robert Futrell
portrays General Twining and the Air Force's point of view on
unified commands:
"From unified commands, " he said, "we get requirements for
forces and weapons needed for clearly defined tasks. In
this respect, they differ from requirements that develop
when you try to plan for meeting all kinds of -war, in all
areas, with all kinds of weapons." Twining favored the
creation of additional unified commands: a joint Strategic
Air Command, for example, should be established along the
lines of the Continental Air Defense Command. In unified
commands, men of all services could become identified as
members of a common mission-men of an oriented force/' 9
General Twining' s comments on the unified commands indicates
that the Air Force was still wanting to push the unified
strategic command idea. The best way for the Air Force to
sell the strategic command idea was to adopt the unified
command principle as a whole.
In the 1956-1957, Colonel Albert Sights, Jr. published an
article entitled "Major Tasks and Reorganization." In his
article Colonel Sights states:
59 Gen. Nathan F. Twining, chief of staff, U.S. Air
Force, " Remarks before the National War College, " 31 May
1956; Washington Daily News, 8 June 195 6 . Cited by Futrell,
575.
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The primary objective of national defense is to counter
the threat of nuclear war. Two basic military tasks are
dictated by this requirement. First, we must maintain a
long-range nuclear striking force capable of inflicting
mortal damage upon any would-be aggressor; and second, we
must present a defensive shield for the protection of our
own sources of strength against an enemy attack. 60
These major tasks call for unified commands that have
"operational control" of commands that are dedicated to a
specific task. 61 It just so happens that the Air Force was
in control of those assets that were to defend the country in
the way he portrayed. Sights stated that the number of combat
commands would be reduced to five from the present seventeen
commands . 62
According to Sights, the first task for the nation's
defense was to guard against nuclear war:
An organization designed to perform this task would
constitute the principal deterrent against any attack in
kind" by a potential aggressor. It should incorporate those
elements of all three services whose primary function is
to strike decisive blows with the most effective weapons
available against the sources of enemy strength in
whatever part of the world they may be found. Weapons
systems and techniques should be chosen to afford an
optimum combination of great offensive power and low
vulnerability to enemy counteraction. Whether they be
airplanes or missiles and whether launched from land or
sea, they should be evaluated and selected solely on the
basis of the task to be done.
This task organization might appropriately be named the
"Strategic Atomic Command." It should stand at all times
60 Col. Albert P. Sights, Jr., "Major Tasks and
Reorganization," Air University Quarterly Review 9 , no. 1




ready for the instant commitment of every resource to its
assigned task. It is the great deterrent to unrestricted
nuclear war. Its deterrent power is the product of its
readiness for action, its offensive potential, and its own
invulnerability to destruction. The Strategic Atomic
Command may be visualized as constituting the present day
counter of Mahan's "position of menace." It must be
maintained as a force-in-being and not diverted to other
tasks in such a way as to compromise the deterrent effect
of its menace. 63
This description of a Strategic Atomic command looks very much
like what General LeMay had in mind for the Strategic Air
Command. It would seem by the remarks of General Twining and
the article published by Colonel Sights that the Air Force was
on the hunt to solidify their strategic bombing mission by
creating a unified strategic command. This new command would
unify all strategic nuclear force under a command that an Air
Force general would head.
Ironically, Sights' force structure was similar to the
task-oriented Unified command structure that was outlined in
the Military Strategy of the United States published in
1992. 64 During the period of Sights' article, the Navy was
trying to keep the idea of further unification at bay.
During the 1958 hearings on defense reorganization,
Admiral Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, and Representative
Richard B. Russell, Chairman of the House Armed Services
Committee, discussed the idea of a unified strategic command:
63 Ibid. ,10-11
64 Military Strategy of the United States , Department of
Defense, January 1992.
32
CHAIRMAN RUSSELL. At present time, I believe, in the
Department of Defense we have nine unified commands that
take their orders directly from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
I suppose the outstanding one is the Strategic Air
Command. In the other services we have strategic forces,
we have carriers in the Navy, we have this new
organization, the Army Strike Corps, I believe they call
it, and in the Navy we soon hope to have functioning the
Polaris
.
Do you foresee that all of these strategic forces will be
combined into a single unified command?
ADMIRAL BURKE. No, sir, because I do not think that we
will have money enough ever in this country to provide
forces solely for a single task and then other forces
solely for another single task. 65
Admiral Burke's answer to Chairman Russell was typical of the
Navy's view of consolidation. The unified commanders would
request forces and the services would just furnish the CinCs
with what they wanted, regardless of what the services'
requirements for those particular forces were at the time.
In late 1959 and early 1960, The Navy was in the process
of launching the first Polaris missile submarine. This new
platform, along with the ICBMs that the Air Force had, would
cause targeting problems. Under Secretary of the Air Force
Malcolm A. Maclntyre stated:
... it seems to me somewhere along the line here there
should be consideration given to the problems of
coordinating the Strategic weapons that are operated by
different services. 6b
65 Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services,
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 , 85th Cong.,
2nd Sess., 19 June 1958, 118.
66 Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space
Sciences, Investigation of Governmental Organization for Space
Activities , 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 22 April 1959, 358-59.
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These targeting problems could have serious implications if
they were not resolved.
General Thomas D. White, the Air Force Chief of staff,
requested the establishment of a unified strategic command. 67
General Power, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command,
agreed with General White that a unified command was needed.
As a specified commander, General Power was in charge of all
strategic nuclear weapons in the United States. Generals
Power and White believed that the Air Force was the logical
choice because it was already in charge of two legs of the
nuclear triad. 68 The third leg would be the Polaris missile
once it became operational. Dr. Futrell describes the
resulting battle between the Air Force and the Navy:
When early discussions failed to reach a positive
decision, General White formally requested the
establishment of a unified US strategic command. He urged
that both the Strategic Air Command and a Polaris
submarine command would be subordinate to the unified
strategic command. General Power supported this proposal.
"I think," he said early in 1960, "that all strategic
weapon systems should be under one central command,
whether it is commanded by an Air Force officer, naval
officer, or Army officer is a moot question." Admiral
Burke, on the other hand, described the Air Force proposal
as "unsound and impractical." He argued that it would not
be practical to take operational command of Polaris
vessels away from fleet commanders since the movements of
these submarines would have to be coordinated with those
of many other naval vessels that would be operating in the
same waters at the same time. Once a Polaris submarine
had fired its strategic missiles, moreover, it would be
expected to operate on missions similar to those of other
submarines. "The Navy," Burke emphasized, "had behind it
67 Futrell. , 5!
b3 Ibid.
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generations of experience in the operation of sea-based
weapon systems. To depart from the principle of the
integrated, balanced fleet at this critical time in
history by assigning Polaris submarines to a command
charged with operating land-based strategic bombers and
missiles would weaken our nation's ability to strike
back . " 69
The point the Navy was trying to make was that the Air Force
did not know how to deal with submarines so the job of running
submarines should be left to the Navy because they are the
experts in submarine warfare. The Air Force on the other hand
did not see controlling the submarines a problem.
This "turf" battle continued, and it eventually received
the attention of President Eisenhower. The Secretary of
Defense met with President Eisenhower on 6 July 1960 to
discuss both the unified strategic command and targeting
issues. Gates briefed the President that the present
targeting procedure was not satisfactory. He stated the
system's problem was that "coordination is done without
benefit of a referee." 70
Secretary Gates believed there was no need for a unified
command. He maintained that a single integrated plan should
be done jointly. Gates said that SAC should be the
organization to create a Single Integrated Operation Plan
(SIOP)
.
71 However, since the whole issue of consolidation
69 Ibid




was so emotional, SAC would act as an agent for the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. This meant that the JCS had final say over
the war plans. Gates also stated that the targeting staff
should have members from all services so that the process
would be coordinated.
President Eisenhower believed that a unified strategic
command was not "feasible at this time." 72 The President
maintained that an integrated plan was more important . Gates
told the President that the whole matter of consolidation was
becoming a press issue.
The compromise of a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
seemed to soothe the Air Force. However, the Navy was not
sold on the idea. Admiral Burke told the President:
This is not a compromise... This is a radical departure
from previous practice. I am fearful that if the
responsibility and authority for making a single operation
plan is delegated to a single commander [then] the JCS
will have lost control over operations at the beginning of
a general war. 73
General Twining, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
was very irritated by Burke's attempt to stop the idea of a




David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill,
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For ten years, he [Burke] stated, the JCS had tried and
failed to improve coordination in nuclear planning. The
major stumbling block was always the Navy, whose leaders
adamantly refused to adapt their carrier task forces or
attack plans to unified command. Now Burke wanted the
first NSTL and SIOP developed on an experimental basis
only, in the hopes that the process could be sabotaged. 74
This kind of interservice rivalry was the norm between the
Air Force and the Navy during the years after World War II.
It was the primary reason that a unified command was not
formed during the 1960's.
F. CONCLUSION
This chapter is crucial because the bitter service
rivalry between the Air Force and the Navy over strategic
nuclear consolidation sets the tone for the next thirty years.
The Air Force's attempts to solidify their strategic bombing
mission .and the Navy's drive to maintain their independence
drove these two services apart. The Air Force's attempt to
bring the Polaris submarine under their control was seen by
the Navy as direct infringement on their mission of sea
control. The dual use of the Polaris as a ballistic missile
carrier and as sea control asset was the main reason the Navy
wanted to maintain operational control of this new weapon
system. In the end, this chapter shows just how monumental
the task was to create a unified strategic
74 Ibid. ,5.
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command in view of the past problems between the Air Force and
the Navy.
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IV. DEFENSE REORGANIZATION IN THE 1980 'S
A. INTRODUCTION
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (GNA) was the latest
attempt by Congress to unify the armed forces. This Act was
created because the Services were not working together. This
was evident after reviewing inadequate of service coordination
and planning during Desert I, the Grenada invasion and later
in the Beirut bombing. According to Congress, the Services
needed some help in seeing the error of their ways. Congress
took action in the form of the GNA of 1986. Members of
Congress believed that by codifying joint requirements the
Services would be forced to work more jointly.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine in part the
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Emphasis is placed on how the
Act forced the services to work more jointly. This chapter is
important to STRATCOM because Congress raised the issue of a
unified strategic command. This time Congress and not the Air
Force wanted the STRATCOM issue reviewed. By Congress raising
the strategic command issue, the Services could not table the
idea as in the past without the prospect of Congress creating
a strategic command by law, as in the case of the Special
Operations Command. The next section addresses the Goldwater-
Nichols Act itself. The following section deals with the
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Unified Command Plan (UCP) and the first UCP after the
Goldwater-Nichols Act became law. The final section provides
an analysis on the argument of whether the Goldwater-Nichols
was the major driving force behind the creation of USSTRATCOM.
B. THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT OF 1986
A quick discussion of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986
(GNA) will help bring the DOD reorganization into perspective.
The GNA had three major points that are relevant to the
discussion of USSTRATCOM. These three points are:




The unified CinCs should have greater say in resource
allocations
.
3. Members of the Armed forces should serve in joint duty
assignments prior to attaining flag rank.
These three points are important to the strategic command
concept because greater jointness is the main aim of GNA.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff role as defined
by Public Law 99-433, section 151, paragraph b, is:
FUNCTION AS MILITARY ADVISOR- (1) The Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal advisor to the
President, the National Security Council, and the
Secretary of Defense. 75
This part of the GNA states further that the other members of
75 Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services,
Reorganization of the Department of Defense , 99th cong., 2nd
sess., 11 March 1986, 1046.
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the Joint Chiefs of Staff are also military advisors to the
President and the Secretary of Defense. This law states that
the Chairman has to forward any dissenting opinions of the
chiefs to the President and the Secretary of Defense. 76
Simply put, the Chairman is no longer the first among equals
on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but he is in fact (law) the
senior ranking member of the military. This gives the
Chairman the power to solve problems among the Services. In
the past, he had to strike a compromise in order to get
anything done. However, the Chairman also must present any
dissenting views of the Chiefs. This would seem to keep the
Chairman in check so that he would command as a joint leader
and not a service parochialist . The new authority of the
Chairman will be evident when the issue of USSTRATCOM is
readdressed.
The second major issue that was resolved by GNA was the
position on the combatant commanders (CinCs) . In this area,
the combatant commander has total control over the forces
assigned to him. In the past, the CinCs had to deal with
component commanders who answered directly to their Services
and not the CinC, thereby circumventing the authority of the
CinC. The GNA (PL 99-433, section 164, para b.) expressly
defines the position of the CinC:
(c) COMMAND AUTHORITY OF COMBATANT COMMANDERS- (1) Unless
otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of
76 Ibid.
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Defense, the authority, direction, and control of the
commander of a combatant command with respect to the
commands and forces assigned to that command include the
command functions of-
(A) giving authoritative direction to subordinate
commands and forces necessary to carry out missions
assigned to the command, including authoritative direction
over all aspects of military operations, joint training
and logistics;
(G) exercising the authority with respect to selecting
subordinate commanders, selecting combatant command staff,
suspending subordinates, and convening courts-
martial, . . . 77
This section adds that the combatant commander has
organizational authority over forces under his command. As a
result, the combatant commander has more say over the
commanders assigned (e.g., fleet commanders) to him and the
organizational structure of the combatant command than in the
past
.
Another area that GNA addresses is that of joint duty
requirements. Previously, some of the officers assigned to
the Joint Staff and unified command staffs were not the "cream
of the crop." The purpose of GNA was to make joint duty
attractive to officers so that the best officers were helping
to run joint operations for the CinCs . In chapter 38 of the
GNA, officer management for joint specialties (PL 99-433, esc
662) is described as follows:
(a) QUALIFICATIONS- The Secretary of Defense shall ensure
that the qualifications of officers assigned joint duty




(1) officers which are serving on, or have served on,
the Joint Staff are expected, as a group, to be promoted
at a rate not less than for officers of the same grade and
competitive category who are serving on, or have served
on, headquarters staff of their armed services;
(2) officers who have the joint specialty, as a group,
to be promoted at a rate not less than the rate of
officers of the same armed force in the same grade and
competitive category who are serving on, the headquarters
staff of their armed force;
(3) officers who are serving in, or have served in,
joint duty assignment (other than of ficers - covered in
paragraphs (1) and (2) are expected, as a group, to be
promoted at a rate not less than the rate for all officers
of the same armed force in the same grade and
competitive. 78
This section of GNA was included to stress the importance of
joint duty. This gives the Joint Staff and unified commands
the authority to demand and get top notch officers. In the
end, joint duty assignments can no longer be used as a dumping
ground for mediocre officers.
The GNA of 1986 profoundly changed the military and forced
the Services to work together. The law also gave a kind of
rebirth to the notion of a unified strategic command. This
readdressal of a unified strategic command was spelled out in
the GNA (PL 99-43 3 section 212 INITIAL REVIEW OF COMBATANT
COMMANDS) :
(a) MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED.- The first review of the
missions, responsibilities (including geographic
boundaries) , and force structure of the unified and
specified combatant commands under section 161 (b) of title
10, United Stated Code, as added by section 2111 of this
Act, shall include consideration of the following:
78 Ibid. ,1067.
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(1) creation of a unified command for strategic missions
which would combine-
(A) the missions, responsibilities, and forces of
the Strategic Air Command;
(B) the strategic missions, responsibilities, and
forces of the Army and Navy; and
(C) other appropriate strategic missions,
responsibilities, and forces of the armed forces. 79
This Act told the military to review how they do business and
in some cases make adjustments. These adjustments included
things like command structure, weapons /communications
procurement and joint duty. However, the Congressional
direction to consider the creation of a unified command for
strategic forces was a clear sign to the Services to combine
their similar forces so that there would not be any costly
redundancy in the country's strategic forces.
C. THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN (UCP)/UCP REVIEW OF 1987
The GNA of 1986 enacted into law a requirement that the
Services consider the creation of a unified strategic command.
The message that Congress sent to the Services was not a
subtle one: there are some areas that can be consolidated to
save the taxpayers money. How did the Joint Chiefs of Staff
modify the unified command structure?
The document that the Joint Staff uses to manage the
unified structure is called the Unified Command Plan. The
79 Ibid., 1058.
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Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1991 defines the Unified Command
Plan as:
. . . basic guidance to the combatant commander on general
responsibilities and identifies the geographic or
functional areas of responsibility (AOR)
.
(a) The UCP is a classified JCS document issued
irregularly but updated periodically. It is a task-
assigning document and, therefore, specifically cites the
authority granted by the Secretary of Defense through
memorandum or DOD directive. The UCP is approved by the
President. 80
Given tha-t definition, without a change to the UCP, there
would be no creation or disestablishment of a unified command.
Furthermore, Presidential approval is required to finalize
changes to the unified command structure.
While the Executive Branch can change the UCP through an
internal review of the unified command structure, Congress
represents an external force that can also change the UCP. An
excellent example of Congress exerting its power to change the
UCP was in the creation of the Special Operations Command.
This command was created by an amendment to the 1987 Defense
Authorization Act. It should be noted that while Congress
passed the bill, the President retained final authority over
the unified command structure by signing the bill into law.
However, the Congressional legislative process was the
external force that eventually forced the establishment of the
Special Operations Command. In the final analysis, the
President has the final say over both internal and external
80 The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1991, 6-13.
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reviews of the UCP. The only way the Congress can override a
Presidential veto is by getting two-thirds of Congress to
override his veto. In the Special Operations Command case,
President Reagan did sign the act into law.
The first UCP review that took place after GNA became law
was in 1987. 81 This review examined section 212 of the GNA
of 1986. Since the UCP is reviewed on an irregular basis, the
passage of GNA provided the Joint Staff a reason to reexamine
the UCP and review its unified command structure.
Captain Paul Brown USN, who was assigned to J-
5
Directorate on the Joint Staff, stated that the review of the
UCP in 1987 was a reaction to section 212. This section
called for the Services to "consider" consolidating nuclear
forces under one unified commander. This section could be
construed as a warning to the Services. According to Brown,
if steps to consolidate were not taken, Congress might have
initiated action to change the UCP by creating another unified
command and codifying it into law. 82 The creation of the
Special Operations Command is an example where Congress acted
to create a unified command before the Services could consider
the concept as mentioned in section 212. This would indicate
that Congress was not willing to wait for the Services to
81 Interview with Captain Paul Brown, USN. Capt . Brown




complete their internal review of the UCP and went ahead and
passed legislation to create a unified command over special
forces
.
The result of the JCS UCP review was to not change the
current structure of nuclear forces. 83 Captain Brown stated
that there was "no support from either the Services or the
CinCs . " The lack of support for a strategic command was
evident when there was no creation of a unified strategic
command after the 1987 review. 84 Captain Brown maintains
that the reasons for not consolidating nuclear forces had not
changed over the past thirty years. The bottom line was that
there was no driving need to change the nuclear force
structure in the 1987 UCP review. 85
D. CONCLUSION
The _GNA pushed to make the Services more joint. However,
the Services failed to capitalize on the first serious
opportunity since 1958 to unify nuclear forces. There were no
major public debates over the unification of nuclear forces in
1987. The Services simply complied with the law that stated






was that the GNA did not carry enough weight by itself in 1987
to force unification of strategic nuclear forces. However,
GNA has had both immediate and cumulative effects. While no
change occurred immediately in 1987, GNA was having a slow
effect on the mindset of the military with regard to Service
cooperation. The eventual retirement of the Service Chiefs
and Chairman Crowe helped bring in new people with fresh
perspectives on a wide range of issues.
The GNA was proclaimed as a reorganization of the
Department of Defense. However, except for growth in the
Joint Staff, there was not much immediate reorganization.
This act primarily gave more power to the Chairman and unified
commanders and pushed joint duty for officers. Few immediate
changes took place. The Services and the DOD maintained their
organizational structure. However, GNA has had a cumulative
institutional effect on service culture. The best way to put
the GNA into perspective is to say that it changed the mind
set of the military. For example, by September 1992, the Navy
had geared its entire new strategy, From The Sea, around the
joint operations concept. However, GNA did not change the
defense organization on the scale of the National Security Act
of 1947.
While the GNA resulted in little external reorganization,
through internal processes, it has had significant effects,
given that the intent of Congress was to get the Services to
consolidate. In 1987, the Services had their chance to
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consolidate nuclear forces and decided not to reorganize the
unified command structure at that time. The President agreed
with the Services by approving the UCP that stated a unified
command over nuclear forces was not needed. In the end, the
GNA did not impress upon the Services enough to consolidate
their nuclear forces under one unified command. However, GNA
established the climate for further consolidation by altering
the mindset (culture) of individual Services to be receptive
to initiatives of service individuals like General Lee Butler.
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The end of the Cold War, starting in 1989, has changed how
the military plans and deploys its forces. Destruction of
the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union was seen
as the end of Communism in Europe. The end of the Cold War is
seen in this thesis as the main argument for the creation of
USSTRATCOM. Once Soviet communism was declared dead, a strong
U.S. nuclear force, in the order of 12,000 warheads, was no
longer needed. The recent proposals to disarm down to 3,500
warheads foretell the nuclear force structure in the near
future. Therefore, there was no need for SAC. Remaining U.S.
nuclear forces could be combined to save money.
B. THE CHANGING OF THE GUARD AT THE JCS
The UCP review of 1987 included the first attempt, since
the passage of GNA, to rejuvenate the idea of a unified
command over strategic forces. The end result was not to
change the unified command plan. However, Congress did force
a change in the UCP by creating a unified command over special
operations forces. The question that must be asked is: Why
not have a unified command over strategic forces as discussed
in the GNA of 1986?
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There are probably two answers to this question. The
first answer is that the Service Chiefs really felt that there
was no reason to change a system that was not broken.
Imbedded in this idea was the continued service rivalry that
the Air Force and the Navy had lived with for the past thirty-
five years. Since there was no public debate over section
212, it can only be surmised that the Service Chiefs were
content to keep a system that they knew and trusted.
The second answer to the question is probably more an
issue of uncertainty with regard to the future of the military
and its force structure. In this case, the Chiefs were caught
in a transition period between the pre-GNA era and the post-
GNA era. The chiefs and the Chairman were either not willing
or unable to make drastic changes in the UCP because they were
the old Cold War warriors who were comfortable with the old
Cold War institutions. The Chairman in particular was not
willing to exert his new powers as the undisputed senior
military officer. The main reason for this seeming lack of
assertiveness by Admiral Crowe stems from the idea the he did
not want to rock the boat and suddenly pull rank over the
other chiefs who until GNA had been equal in stature. 37
General George L. Butler, Commander in Chief United




If Admiral Crowe had exerted his new power, the other Service
Chiefs would have bucked the chairman and nothing would have
gotten done. 88
The only way to get through the transition period and on
with' new ideas was to appoint new Service Chiefs and a new
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Fortunately, the
military establishment did not have to wait too long for
changes at the top. By the summer of 1989, there had been a
complete change in Service Chiefs and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The most important change was the arrival of
General Colin Powell, USA, as the new Chairman. He was
politically astute, well liked and trusted within all circles
in Washington including the military. His two previous jobs
were as National Security Advisor under President Reagan and
as Commander-in-Chief Forces Command.
The second major player in the creation of USSTRATCOM,
General Lee Butler, USAF, had moved up from the Vice Director
for Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5, of the Joint Staff to
Director of J-5. General Butler would be the man who would
bring the idea of a unified strategic command over nuclear
forces to reality.
General Butler stated that when General Powell became the
chairman, the two of them sat down and discussed their views
Butler, interview.
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of what the future would look like. 89 General Butler stated
his views to General Powell as follows:
General, I think the Cold War is over. We're about to see
a sweeping transformation of the international security
environment. That is going to lead to a task for you to
take the United States Armed Forces down an entirely new
path, one that involves sharp reductions, a revisit of
roles and missions, and into a technological future whose
outlines we are only beginning to see. 90
This statement to the new Chairman indicates that General
Butler was thinking about the future in a new way with new
ideas. While General Butler was not prophesying the immediate
collapse of the Soviet Union, he was planning for a future
where the Soviet Union would no longer be the threat that it
once had been. General Powell's response was one of agreement
with General Butler. 9:
General Butler stated that Chairman Powell gave him a kind
of intellectual license to go out and come up with ideas of
what the future would look like. Powell told Butler not to
worry about things like Service rivalries, laws or money. 92
His job was to come up with a plan of what the military would
look like in the future.
89 Presentation By General George L. Butler to the Air
Force Historical Foundation, 18 September 1992.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 General George L. Butler, Commander-in-Chief United




General Butler then had a brain-storming session with
members of his staff in J-5 on the future of the military. It
was at that point that General Butler proposed the idea that
a strategic command over nuclear forces should be brought up
again. 93 Major Outlaw, USMC, was the principal action
officer for the draft plan for USSTRATCOM. By August 1990,
the first draft of USSTRATCOM was in the hands of General
Butler. 94
The rest of the plan that General Butler developed with
his staff was a new UCP. General Butler stated to the author
that the plan he presented to the Chairman included not only
a unified strategic command, but four other CinCs . These
included the two area CinCs, Pacific and Atlantic commands, a
Space Command and finally a contingency command. 95
According to General Butler, Space command was the odd CinC.
Since he did not know what to do with Space command, General
Butler said he left the decision to General Powell. 9b
Once the initial plan was drawn up, General Butler and his
staff refined each part of the UCP prior to briefing the
Chairman. The Chairman accepted the initial plan and decided
to present it to the Chiefs in a Tank meeting on 21 November





1990. 9 ' The two biggest issues that were to be discussed
were strategic command and another command that would be a
super CinC. 98
The new command was dubbed Americas Command by General
Maxwell Thurman. The initial reaction by the Chiefs was
heated because this new command would essentially take the
place of the Services as the primary trainers of their forces.
After further heated discussion the final resolution by the
Chiefs was to table the idea for another time. 99
Brinkmanship by the chairman enabled the USSTRATCOM idea to
survive the hostility of the Americas Command proposal. 100
The further development of the STRATCOM proposal was to be
done at the Joint Staff level so that Service parochialism
would not interfere with the planned UCP. The basic
assumption was that if the initial plan were developed by the
Joint Staff, then the Services would not feel threatened by an
aggressive service idea. 101 The only CinC who attempted to
give input to the strategic command idea was General John
Chain, USAF, Commander-in-Chief Strategic Air Command. In July
1991, General Chain gave his inputs to General Powell because






he discovered that the Joint Staff was working on the
strategic command idea again. General Powell wrote General
Chain thanking him for his concern about the new UCP but told
him that he would not solicit any suggestions on the draft UCP
until the draft had been briefed to the CinCs at the CinCs
conference in August. 102
The draft UCP was briefed to the Chiefs on 15 July 1991.
The reaction to the UCP change that would create USSTRATCOM
received a favorable review from the Chiefs. The Air Force
was not hard to sell because the Air Force had sought such a
change for the past thirty years. The Army and Marine Corps
really did not have any stake in the new command because
neither one of these Services were in the strategic nuclear
business. The Navy was the only Service which had to be sold
on the plan. During the meeting, Chairman Powell left the
issues of USSTRATCOM and Americas Command up to the Chiefs.
The Chiefs resoundingly killed the Americas Command idea.
They believed that an Americas Command would infringe on the
institutional prerogatives of the Services. Once the issue of
Americas Command was settled, General Powell asked Admiral
Kelso what he thought about the STRATCOM proposal. Admiral
Kelso said the plan had "merit." 103 The only problem that
he saw was a personnel problem. This problem was strictly a
10
- Brown, interview.
103 General Butler and Captain Brown repeated the same
comment in interviews with the author.
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manning issue. Admiral Kelso did not know if he could free up
enough people initially to staff positions at the new unified
command. However, Admiral Kelso said that "the devil was in
the details." 104 In the end, Admiral Kelso gave the STRATCOM
proposal his personal support.
The proposed UCP went to the CinCs conference in August
1991. The outcome of the conference was the same as the Tank
meeting the month before. There was heated debate over the
Americas Command but the STRATCOM idea went through without
too much problem. 105
The question that has to be asked is: Why did the Navy go
along with the STRATCOM proposal now when they fought the
issue for the past thirty years? The answer comes down to who
prepared the plan and the personalities involved. 106 The
plan was prepared and proposed by the Joint Staff instead of
the Air Force, as it had been in the past. This made it
easier to sell to the Chiefs because no one service was
directly threatening another. Also, the people involved were
willing to put aside their service parochialism and seriously
consider the plan. After the August conference, the real
selling of the STRATCOM plan went into effect.
104 Butler, interview.
105 Butler, interview.
106 General Butler, Vice Admiral Colley and Captain Brown
all agree that personalities was the main driver for the
creation of USSTRATCOM.
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C. THE END OF STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
The Persian Gulf War left the United States with a
resounding victory credited largely to the effectiveness of
air power. The Air Force had a fantastic public relations
campaign going during the war. This campaign gave the Air
Force an A+ for their performance during the Gulf War.
However, General Butler knew that the Strategic Air Command
forces did not live up to their press clippings. 107
After the war, General Butler wanted to have a "gloves off
assessment" of SAC's performance during the Gulf War. General
Butler felt that the conventional training of bomber crews was
seriously lacking and the SAC generals' meeting agreed with
Butler's assessment of SAC's performance. 108 General Butler
believed that something had to change with regard to the role
of SAC. During his confirmation as CINCSTRAT, General Butler
explained to Senator Nunn why SAC was disestablished:
I think that they (SAC personnel) understand a number of
very profound things. One, the Cold War is over. They
know that. They realize that the world has become a very
different place. Strategic Air Command was organized for
essentially one purpose, and that is assist in the global
U.S. strategy to contain communism, and play a vital role
in that regard, but that threat has essentially receded
and it is a different kind of world.
I think the key that unlocked it for me and for all of our
people was the Gulf War, when they saw the vital role that
SAC's aerial forces-- the bombers, the tankers, and
reconnaissance--played. That had a big impact on the




that time that with the drawing down of the Soviet threat,
with the changing world and the likelihood of the kinds of
contingencies that we saw in the Gulf --perhaps not on that
scale, but certainly of threat type-- that our aerial
forces were best suited to be married, as they were many
years ago with the conventional forces in the Tactical Air
Command. 109
This statement by the last commander of SAC shows that the Air
Force took a hard look at their command structure and decided
to change. The disestablishment of SAC came at a time when
General Butler was finalizing the creation of U.S. Strategic
Command. General Butler maintains that his proposal to
disestablish SAC was the "spark that lit the reorganization
fuse for the Air Force." 110 In the end, General Butler knew
that Strategic Command could replace SAC without any loss of
deterrent capability. He explained that the bomber force
could be combined with the forces in TAC to concentrate on
conventional missions and still be able to accomplish their
nuclear mission if the situation occurred. He also stated
that the submarine force could provide a credible deterrent
posture. nl
The final touches of USSTRATCOM were being ironed out.
General Butler went and talked to Admiral Kelso to obtain his
ideas on the organizational structure of STRATCOM. The
Admiral believed that there should be strong Navy
109 Congress, Senate, Stenographic Transcript of Hearings




representation on the staff at STRATCOM. 112 General Butler
also consulted with the other nuclear CinCs . The other
nuclear CinCs had no problems in relinquishing their nuclear
roles. The CinCs believed that the nuclear mission was
sapping their staffs and were glad to get rid of the
responsibility. 113 The CinCs were glad to get rid of the
nuclear planning baggage and instead concentrate on planning
for regional, non-nuclear contingencies that were more likely
to occur. However, with the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, future regional contingencies may not be strictly
non-nuclear in nature. In this case, the regional CinCs may
have forfeited their nuclear roles thinking of the "classic"
nuclear war and overlooked the future unconventional nuclear
wars that may occur in their specific regions.
D. A NEW ERA OF SERVICE COOPERATION
The creation of STRATCOM came at a period when the world
was changing. The Persian Gulf War was started and concluded
during the drafting of the UCP change and the coup in the
Soviet Union had not taken place until the STRATCOM proposal
was already accepted by the Services and the CinCs.
112 Butler , interview.
113 Vice Admiral Michael C. Colley, Deputy Commander in
Chief, U.S. Strategic Command, interviewed by author,
Offutt,AFB, 8 March 1993.
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There were three reasons why the STRATCOM idea was not
opposed by the Navy as it had back in 1959. The first reason
was the initial plan was proposed by the Joint Staff and not
a service. If a service such as Air Force had once again
proposed the STRATCOM idea, the Navy would possibly view the
idea as a land grab by the Air Force at the expense of the
Navy. In this case, General Butler's position as a Joint
Staff officer overshadowed the fact the he was also an Air
Force officer. His reputation as a honest broker helped the
STRATCOM idea come into being.
The second reason why the Navy now accepted the idea of a
unified strategic nuclear command was that they were not
threatened as an institution. The original plan for a
strategic command in 1960 was seen by the Navy as an Air Force
attempt to gain control over all strategic nuclear missions.
This meant that the Air Force would be in command of all
nuclear forces including naval assets. Under the present
system, the only institution that suffered was Strategic Air
Command. The Navy did not have to make such a drastic change.
The command structure of the ballistic submarine force
remained unchanged except at the very top. Simply put, the
submarine commander saw no change in how he did his business.
In the end, the Air Force was willing to disestablish SAC.
This action alone suggests that the Air Force is not as
institutionally oriented as the Navy. The disestablishment of
SAC seems to follow Builder's assertion that the Air Force is
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not truly an institution. 114 The argument could be made that
the Air Force was willing to disestablish a command in order
to save the bombers. While this could be true, there is no
solid evidence to prove this theory.
The final reason why the Navy accepted STRATCOM was simply
personality-driven. If Admiral Kelso had not gone along with
the plan, General Powell was willing to let the issue die.
Instead, Admiral Kelso had the same foresight as General
Butler and saw STRATCOM as an "idea whose time has come." 11 "
Admiral Kelso was also involved in the details for
establishing STRATCOM. He went to the fleet and told the
commanders that he was onboard with the STRATCOM idea and that
the Navy would do everything to make the plan work. He
finally went to the retired Navy leaders and told them that
views like Rear Admiral Holland's were old Cold War
thinking. 1U> Captain Brown stated that when the Holland
article was published, General Powell decided not to respond
to the article, primarily because it was nothing more than
outdated service parochialism. 117 General Butler believed
that the Holland article actually helped the STRATCOM proposal
114 Builder, 32.
115 Butler, interview.
116 Colley and Butler, interview. Admiral Holland wrote a
an article in the August 1991 issue of Proceedings blasting
the idea of a unified strategic command.
117 Brown, interview.
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because it was a purely parochial argument that was really old
Cold War thinking and outdated. 118
E. CONCLUSION
The end of the Cold War arguably was not really the major
driver in the creation of STRATCOM. The time period when the
plan was under development included both pre-coup and post-
coup Soviet eras. According to General Butler, the people
involved was the lone major driving factor in the creation of
USSTRATCOM. During his Senate confirmation hearings, General
Butler responded to a question from Senator Exxon as to why
STRATCOM was standing up now:
Senator Exxon: Had there not been a demise of the Soviet
Union as a superpower as we have seen in the last 2 or 3
years, would--in your judgment-- had not happened, would
we still have made dramatic changes that have taken place
and the creation of a new STRATCOM command at Offutt; or
would we more likely have maintained our SAC structure, as
was the case for the last 30 or 40 years?
General Butler: Senator, I think we should have done this
3 years ago when it was first proposed.
The Goldwater-Nichols legislation underscored the
importance of unified field commands; of putting under
the operational control of one commander all of the forces
that are responsible for a uniquely-identifiable mission
of broad and continuing scope. That is the definition of
a unified command.
If ever there were a mission that fit that definition, it
is strategic nuclear deterrence. And as consequence, I
think what we are doing now is simply a rather late
arrival at a solution was offered in 1959.
118 Butler, interview.
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As to what immediately prompted it, while the end of the
Cold War did encourage us to think more broadly about a
question of our global, military organization, I really
think it is attributable, most importantly, to an advance
in interservice cooperation, and a willingness to address
issues and to make changes that, in the past, were simply
not possible because people did not have sufficient trust,
one service to another, to put their forces under the
control of someone who did not wear the same uniform. 119
General Butler also strongly maintains that Admiral Kelso was
the major reason why the stand-up of STRATCOM went so
smoothly. 120 His answer clearly states that while GNA and
the end of the Cold War did have some impact on the creation
of STRATCOM, personalities were really the major driving
factor in the creation of STRATCOM.
In the end, General Butler was right. However, the fact
that the post GNA 1987 UCP review did not result in the
immediate unity of command over nuclear forces is too
simplistic a judgement. It appears that the cumulative effect
of GNA on Service mindsets, or culture, at least produced an
"enabling effect" that empowered the right people to make this
monumental change at the right time.
119 Congress, Senate, Transcripts of General Butler's
confirmation hearings, 14 May 1992, 60-1.
120 Butler, Colley, and Brown, interview.
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VI . CONCLUSIONS
This chapter evaluates the major thesis arguments for the
1992 creation of USSTRATCOM. These competing arguments are:
1. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was the driving factor
that forced the creation of a unified command over strategic
forces
.
2. The end of the Cold War was the major driver in the
establishment of USSTRATCOM.
These two arguments were pitted against each other in order to
determine which one was really the driving force behind the
creation of U.S. Strategic Command.
The first argument dealt with the GNA. This act included
a section that requested the Services to "consider" the idea
of creating a unified strategic command. The Services did
review the idea to consolidate all nuclear forces. This was
conducted in the form of a UCP review. The Services used this
forum to debate and discuss the possibility of creating a
unified strategic command. The end result of that review in
1987 was not to consolidate nuclear forces and therefore leave
the present U.S. nuclear command structure in place.
It would appear that the Services and the CinCs were not
willing to debate the issue. The reasons given for keeping
the present structure in place were the same ones the Services
had argued over for the past 35 years. However, GNA did start
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to change the mindset within the Services about jointness and
the need for greater cooperation.
The second explanation is that the end of the Cold War
forced the consolidation of strategic nuclear forces under one
unified commander. The evidence used to support this argument
dealt primarily with those individuals who were instrumental
in the creation of USSTRATCOM. General Butler, Commander-in-
Chief, U.S. Strategic Command, was instrumental in answering
the argument . He maintained that the end of the Cold War did
force the Services to think more broadly, but that it was not
the main reason for the creation of USSTRATCOM. Vice Admirals
Colley, Bacon, and Captain Brown of the Joint Staff,
corroborated the assertions that General Butler has made time
and again in speeches and in testimony before Congress. 121
The reason why STRATCOM was created was not a dramatic
one. It was neither enactment of GNA nor the end of the Cold
War. The answer was as simple as trust among the Chiefs.
General Butler has testified to Congress that the Services
were willing to put aside their differences and create a
strategic command because the personalities involved trusted
each other. The creation of USSTRATCOM was possible because
men like General Powell, General Butler, Admiral Kelso and
Vice Admiral Colley were willing to make it happen despite
121 VADM R.F. Bacon, USN (ret.), "Seizing the Strategic
Baton," United States Naval Institute Proceedings , May 1992,
74-5.
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past Service differences. General Butler gives the Navy and
Admiral Kelso great credit for making the establishment of
STRATCOM go so smoothly. 122 It should be noted that even
though the GNA and the end of the Cold War did not directly
cause the creation of STRATCOM, they certainly were excellent
reasons to consolidate after the people involved decided to
make the new unified command become a reality.
In retrospect, while the idea of a unified strategic
command probably "had merit" 35 years ago, it took personal
trust among the service chiefs and altered circumstances to
put aside their past rivalries to make STRATCOM a reality.
After interviewing officers at STRATCOM, one gets the feeling
that everything is going smoothly. General Butler and Vice
Admiral Colley maintain that the transition has been very
smooth. While this may be true to some extent, all the
Service rivalries do not disappear overnight. It will take
time before the Air Force and Navy learn to speak the same
language. 123
The future will tell whether forming STRATCOM was a good
idea or a moot point, in view of the changing world
environment. The end of the Cold War may have lessened the
need for a strategic command. However, as long as there are
nuclear weapons in the world, there will be a need for
122 Butler, interview.
123 CDR. C.J. Pickart of USSTRATCOM (aide to Vice Admiral
Colley), telephone interview, 30 November 1992.
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STRATCOM. 124 The START II and START II follow-on treaties
that are about to take effect are sure to give STRATCOM a
healthy amount of business. On the planning side of STRATCOM,
members of J-5 (previously JSTPS) suggest that the SIOP may no
longer play the central role that it had in the past. 125
In the end, STRATCOM was probably the best move for all
concerned. The rotation of the CinC between Air Force and
Navy may allow interservice rivalry to fade away to a large
extent
. The new doctrine ( Doctrine for Joint Nuclear
Operations , Joint Pub 3-12) that STRATCOM developed solidifies
its position as a true unified command because it speaks for
all Services on nuclear issues, not just one. Since this
command is new, the test of time will unveil its
effectiveness
.
The circumstances that were involved in the creation of
STRATCOM could be applied to future changes in the military
establishment. Individual trust among the Service Chiefs will
in the long run be required to win over the old and
destructive interservice rivalries. Men like Generals Powell
and Butler and Admiral Kelso have been able to bring about the
Service cooperation that GNA envisioned. In the future, the
Chiefs and their Services must be willing to be open-minded
and ready to approve changes that in the past were unheard of
124 Colley, interview.
125 MAJ. Lester of USSTRATCOM J-512, telephone interview
by author, 18 November 1992.
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(e.g., creating STRATCOM) . In the end, the next Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff must also be a forward thinking man
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